Yiddish Theatre
The Big Bang, by Simon Singh.
Violence and Democracy, by John Keane.
Understanding Islamic Terrorism, by Patrick Sookhdeo
.
The Fly in the Cathedral, by Brian Cathcart.
Sex Education or Indoctrination?, by Valerie Riches.
A New Dark Age of Barbaric Affluence
:
‘The beginning of a dark age devoted to barbaric affluence’:
Oakeshott’s assertion of where civilization was heading in 1972
struck some as unduly pessimistic. Now, thirty-four years later,
his diagnosis seems (to many) less like a gloomy prediction,
more like a well-put observation.
I was drawn to Oakeshott’s work because I felt he offered a convincing
account of much that is puzzling in our modern world. He is particularly
refreshing in one important respect: whatever his shortcomings may be,
an excessive reverence for sacred cows is not one of them. This lack of
reverence is surely one reason for his relative obscurity. To have a
good solid constituency, you must make obeisance to at least one
sacred cow. If you would be an alternative guru à la Chomsky,
you must believe in ‘the people’; if you would be a free-market hero,
you must worship the golden calves of affluence and corporate power;
if you would be a progressive liberal, you must genuflect to the
moos of rationalism and science.
Oakeshott is in thrall to none of these. In some ways, his outlook is
closer to certain Eastern philosophers than to the mainstream European
tradition. He is particularly fond of quoting the philosopher Chuang Tzu
and various features of his thought seem more familiar in the Eastern
than in the Western tradition: to mention a few, his disdain for power;
his non-religious spirituality; his respect for ritual; his detachment
from worldly ambition; and his recognition of story-telling as a means
by which philosophy occasionally ‘reaches the level of literature’.
I mention these because they are all significant in the story of
Oakeshott’s preoccupation with the idea of a ‘dark age of barbaric
affluence’. The sentence in which this phrase appears is
the following:
‘The design to substitute ‘socialization’ for education has gone
far enough to be recognised as the most momentous occurrence of
this century, the greatest of the adversities to have overtaken
our culture, the beginning of a dark age devoted to barbaric
affluence.’
I want to examine what he means by this sentence. My motive is not
to find guidance or useful tips, just a bit of understanding. Oakeshott
warned us repeatedly that philosophy has no practical use.
‘If we seek guidance,’ he wrote in an essay titled Political Philosophy,
‘we must hang up philosophy’. And yet in the same essay he introduced
a paradox. Philosophy, being ‘radically subversive reflection’,
questions the very assumptions we employ in practical living and
so may have far-reaching practical consequences. Oakeshott
compared the philosopher to a scientist investigating the
nature of heat. The scientist is not trying to warm the room
he inhabits, but his investigation may have huge implications
for those who want to warm rooms in the future.
And Oakeshott certainly was ‘radically subversive’
in his thinking. He put his position most forcefully
in the last dozen-or-so pages of ‘On Human Conduct’ where
he ridicules political opinion-makers as ‘somnambulists’
and ‘jokers’, and states that our familiar political dualisms
- such as left/right, progressive/conservative, pluralist/centralist
- are insignificant compared to the the manifestations of two
fundamentally opposed human dispositions, which may for convenience’s
sake be abbreiviated to individualism and collectivism. This opposition,
and the tensions it brings to human activity, is the subject of most
of his work.
Isaiah Berlin, taking an idea from the ancient Greek poet Archilochus,
suggested that thinkers can be categorised as either foxes or hedgehogs.
‘The fox knows many tricks,’ wrote Archilochus in the 7th century BCE.
‘The hedgehog only knows one, but it’s a winner’.
Hedgehog-philosophers, says Berlin, ‘relate everything
to a single central vision, a single organising principle in
terms of which all they are and say has significance.’
Oakeshott made a similar observation about Hobbes some decades earlier;
‘the coherence of Hobbes thought,’ he said, ‘lies in a single passionate
thought that pervades its parts.’ Surely Oakeshott too is a philosopher
of this type; a hedgehog-philosopher. He elaborates his single central
vision in many manifestations; in politics, in law, in morality, in
education, and in aesthetics.
Oakeshott’s central vision is a polarity, and its political
manifestation is familiar to all his readers. The political
polarity is between two incompatible answers to the question,
What role should the State play in our lives? The collectivist
says the state should be the overseer of a great common enterprise
and involve us all in a great common purpose. This kind of state
needs great power to realize its vision. The individualist believes
the state should consist in an indifferent and impartial rule of
law, accomodating our differences and mitigating conflict without
imposing uniformity. This kind of state needs a bare minimum of power.
Oakeshott’s object of attention was the modern European state;
but his analysis is important for the rest of the world, partly
because various versions of the modern European state have been
adopted by - or imposed upon - other nations of the world, and partly
because the economic and military power of states built upon the European
model have made them objects of desire and political aspiration.
Returning to our sentence, it concerns of course not politics but
education, culture and civilization.
At first sight it might seem surprising that he called
‘the design to substitute socialization for education’
‘the most momentous occurrence’ of a century that had endured
and seen off both Hitler and Stalin. It is an unusually passionate
sentence for Oakeshott, who normally expresses himself with a calm
and rather English reserve. To understand what he meant, we have to
consider what he meant by ‘socialization’, ‘education’, ‘culture’
and ‘barbarism’.
Oakeshott returned again and again to the theme that the words
we use are full of ambiguities.
Words such as ‘freedom’, ‘rights’, and ‘democracy’,
he said, have long histories, and their meanings have shifted
over time. Furthermore, when unscrupulous operators use them
to rally supporters in some great cause, such words tend to become
mere slogans, hazy promises of better things to come. The warm glow
of anticipation they excite may be as deceptive as the witches’
promises to Macbeth.
Education is another such word with multiple meanings. It can mean
practical or vocational training. It can mean getting any old
qualification for earning a living (as Oakeshott puts it, a ‘certificate
to let one in on the exploitation of the world’). It can mean a
child discovering who he or she really is. Or it can mean the business
of transmitting our culture and civilization from one generation to
the next.
Oakeshott meant something larger, more complex and more vital than all
of these. Moreover, he felt that liberal education was under mortal threat;
and in order to defend itself, it needed to understand itself clearly.
Liberal education, he said, is where, ‘emancipated from the here and now
of current engagements, we learn the languages of human self-understanding.
These are the different languages of (for example) the natural sciences,
history, philosophy, of poetic imagination.’ These languages are ‘not
merely diverse modes of understanding the world, but the most substantial
expressions we have of human self-understanding’.
In one of his most resonant idioms, Oakeshott said these languages of
self-understanding are themselves voices in a conversation. This
conversation is ‘an endless unrehearsed intellectual adventure in which
we enter into a variety of modes of understanding the world and ourselves,
and are not disconcerted by the differences or dismayed by the
inconclusiveness of it all.’ The flourishing of these voices is
what constitutes our civilization. Barbarism intrudes when one voice
wants to dominate the conversation, and it is victorious when one voice
succeeds in suppressing all the rest. According to Oakeshott, it is the
art of conversation that ‘always distinguishes the civilized man from
the barbarian.’
Liberal education is the process of learning some of these languages and
becoming acquainted with others. Oakeshott emphasises learning: ‘None of
us is born human,’ he says; ‘each of us is what we learn to become.’
This statement, of course, would stampede
several varieties of sacred cow.
But the truth of the statement is surely evident when we consider
how a child brought up by wolves is hardly what we call human at all,
nor will it be able to learn this quality subsequently. Stories about
feral children with happy endings - such as Francois Truffault’s film
L’Enfant Sauvage - have to alter the historical facts upon which they
are based. Feral children do not in fact learn humanity. They remain
savage.
So, education is part of a slow and sometimes painful process of
learning to be human. ‘For the teacher, it is part of his engagement
of being human; for the learner it is the engagement of becoming human.’
People who disparage this view of education as ‘cultural conditioning’
are talking rubbish, says Oakeshott: ‘a man is his culture; and what he
is, he has had to learn to become.’
Barbarians, by definition, are people who know nothing of a cultured
way of life, and when a civilization weakens they gather to loot, and
maybe destroy it. The kind of barbarians Oakeshott had in mind are not
wild-eyed horse-riding types from the wastes of central Asia. They are
barbarians within - like the ones Erasmus wrote about in his Antibarbari
(also in defence of education) only five hundred years earlier.
They are men and women who want to seize control of society
in the name of some great vision, in order to impose that vision
on the rest of us. In Erasmus’ time, the barbarians were religious
dogmatists; in Oakeshott’s day, they were and are social engineers.
‘Socialization’ is the process by which social engineers create a
new kind of person who will be malleable material for their visionary
dreams. Would-be social engineers are inevitably confronted with the
question, what kind of citizen do we want to produce? Of course, the
answer varies from time to time, from society to society, and it is
a tribute to the versatility of the social engineer that the nature
of the project is less important than the fact that there is a project
to be getting on with. Oakeshott described socialization as ‘the
doctrine that because the current here-and-now is very much more
uniform than it used to be, education should recognize and promote
this uniformity... Every learner should be recognised as nothing but
a role-performer in a so-called social system.’
When socialization replaces education, what is offered to the next
generation shrinks from the unknown and potentially infinite to the
small and always shrivelling. What could have been an adventure in
self-understanding, its possibilities intimated but never known,
becomes the business of accomodating to a contemporary culture
that is already shrinking as its members grow unfamiliar with
the notion that there is more to life than the petty concerns
of the moment. Socialization, says Oakeshott, ‘not only strikes
at the heart of liberal learning, it portends the abolition of man.’
What does Oakeshott mean by this astonishing phrase, the abolition
of man?
I suppose it is fair to say of Oakeshott that he was not, in any
sense of the word, a materialist; nor even a utilitarian. In this
respect he quotes Paul Valery: ‘Tout ce qui fait le prix de la vie
est curieusement inutile’: ‘Everything that makes up the value of
life is curiously useless’.
Affluence, of course, is not inherently barbaric. Aristotle was
only the first to remind us that a certain amount of affluence is
necessary for civilization to exist at all. Affluence becomes barbaric
when all other activities are regarded as secondary or subservient
to its pursuit - when society is permeated by what Oakeshott referred
to, always in quotation marks, as ‘the plausible ethics of productivity’.
In a book review of 1949, he attacked this ethic:
‘The good life here is nothing other than the enjoyment by more and more people of more and more of everything … So far as I am concerned it involves a revolting nothingness, which has only to be successful to reduce human life to absolute insignificance’.
The ‘plausible ethics of productivity’ produce a slavery to wants.
He wrote about this slavery to wants in various essays and from various
points of view.
In his essay ‘Work and Play’, for instance, he wrote:
‘To be a creature of wants, desires which cannot have more than
a temporary satisfaction because each satisfaction, however easily
achieved, leads only to new wants - to be a creature of wants is
itself a curse, a condemnation to a life in which every achievement
is also a frustration... It is an activity of getting and spending,
of making and consuming, endlessly.’
The dream of satisfying every want, says Oakeshott, has consumed
our civilization. In the same essay, he describes the progress of
that dream as it took hold in the West:
‘I suppose that at no time in the history of the world has
mankind been more determined to devote itself to exploitation
of nature for the satisfation of all its wants, less dismayed
at the proliferation of wants to be satisfied, or more confident
of success. This enterprise, I have suggested, is as old as the
human race, as old as the emergence of man as a creature of wants
rather than of needs. What is comparatively new is the faith and
fervour with which it is being pursued and the manner in which
all else tends to be regarded as subordinate to the happiness
that comes from the satisfaction of wants.’
Oakeshott was fairly pessimistic about where this enterprise would
lead.
‘When what a man can get from the use and control of the natural
world and his fellow men is the sole criterion of what he thinks
he needs, there is no hope that the major part of mankind will
find anything but good in this exploitation until it has been
carried far enough to reveal its bitterness to the full.’
Oakeshott concludes his essay by saying that the defence
against this ‘barbarity’ can only lie in education. Socialization
provides no such defense; in fact, it prepares the citizen to be
a working unit in this slavery to wants.
As a project capable of uniting society, ‘enjoyment by more
and more people of more and more of everything’ proved to be
a promising one. All the great powers - corporations, governments
trade unions - were happy to join in. By and large, democracies
embraced the project with open arms, and in his essay The Masses
in Representative Democracy Oakeshott examined the process by
which this occurred.
Here, Oakeshott explains what he means by a phrase we come
across often in his work: ‘the illusions of democracy’. The
idea that democracy is to some extent an illusion is familiar,
but as usual Oakeshott provides us with a more chilling insight.
‘What in fact has happened,’ he writes, ‘whenever the disposition
of ‘popular government’ has imposed itself, is that the prospective
representative has drawn up his own mandate and then, by a
familiar trick of ventriloquism, has put it into the mouth of
his electors: as an instructed delegate, he is not an individual,
and as a ‘leader’ he relieves his followers of the need to make
choices for themselves. Thus was generated a new art, not of
ruling, but of knowing what offer will collect most votes, and
of making it in such a manner that it appears to come from ‘the
people’ (the art, in short, of ‘leading’ in the modern idiom).’
So, here we have two themes; the leader as ventriloquist, and
the pursuit of affluence as a purpose popular enough to unite
a democratic state. Oakeshott returned to both these themes in
his magnum opus ‘On Human Conduct’, where we have the memorable
sentence: ‘The outcome of trying to make the state a paradise
has always been to turn it into a hell’.
This sentence provided him with the theme of his last substantial
work, titled The Tower of Babel. He approaches his theme in a
somewhat unusual way - by re-telling an old myth.
Oakeshott had a high opinion of myth. Hobbes’ Leviathan, according
to Oakeshott, is ‘one of the masterpieces of the literature of
our language and civilization’ because it is an authentic
re-telling of the myth that is the common dream of our civilization.
When a work of philosophy reaches this level, he says, ‘its gift
is not an access of imaginative power, but an increase of knowledge;
it will prompt and it will instruct. In it, we shall be reminded
of the common dream that binds the generations together, and
the myth will be made more intelligible to us.’
Philosophy prompting? Philsophy instructing? Can this be
Oakeshott talking? And - myth and philosophy all scrambled up?
Was not Oakeshott the great drawer of boundaries? Did he not
insist that category errors are the great source of confusion?
But consistency is the first victim of genius and one of Oakeshott’s
strengths is that he did not suppress contraditions.
It seems to me that Oakeshott’s retelling of the Babel story is
even more illuminating of our present condition than of the time
it was written; in other words, we have moved nearer to the model
of human conduct he describes.
The citizens of Babel want not just affluence, but an end to any
sense of deprivation. They resent the humiliating conditions
imposed upon Adam and Eve when they were thrown out of the Garden
of Eden. They want to transform their world of dirt and pain, of
thorns and thistles and sweat and mortality, into a land of
guaranteed plenty. They take seriously the old fantasy of a
land where everything is for free; the land flowing with milk
and honey, the peach-blossom fountain, the Big Rock Candy Mountain.
They are going to make good their dreams by storming heaven; by
taking away from God control of the satisfactions he doles out
so stingily to humankind.
The city of Babel is in many ways recognizable to us. It
is ‘a city of Freedom; the home of every imaginable lib.’
Its people are self-absorbed and self-indulgent; they are
rebellious, with the rebelliousness ‘not of wild and passionate
people, but of spoiled children.’ They are ‘not strikingly affluent’,
but they are ‘devoted to affluence’. What they expect from life
is the ‘ready satisfaction of all their wants.’ But because
their wants are unlimited, they experience a constant sense
of deprivation. Indeed, this ‘profound feeling of being
deprived’ is what they share in common.
The ruler of Babel is a charismatic leader. Like other Babelians
he is a person of infinite wants. He rouses the people to communal
action in the one project which can unite them all: putting an end
once and for all to their sense of deprivation. They will build a
mighty tower all the way up to heaven, displace God by force and ‘
appropriate for the enjoyment of all Babelians the limitless
profusion of paradise.’
The citizens of Babel are thus joined in a great collective
enterprise, fuelled by enthusiasm for a better future. The leader
is able to compulsorily commandeer resources (including ‘human
resources’) for the great task in hand, and all that makes up a
free society - institutions, professions, law are absorbed into
the great task, their original purpose forgotten.
Because almost everyone is caught up in the enthusiasm, there
is no need for political oppression. Sceptics go unheard except in
their homes. The government is not guilty of ‘the more scandalous
charges which may be brought against collectivism in action’:
there are no concentration camps, no wars, no torture camps.
Babelians are not racist or intolerant. These obvious evils
are not Oakeshott’s theme. His theme is that the project
itself is enough to create hell and eventually bring ruin
upon them all.
As time goes on, what started off as ‘a distant and
precarious vision of limitless loot’ turns into a monotony
of hard work. Paradise seems as remote as ever. Moreover,
the morally dubious nature of the undertaking has its effect
upon the mood of the people. In a fascinating passage,
Oakeshott describes the difference between living in a civilization
of which one may feel proud, and being part of an enterprise which
engenders misgivings - if not positive shame:
‘Confidence in the nobility of a long and difficult enterprise
may go far to sustain its pursuit and it may even make its collapse
endurable. Indeed, an illusion of nobility may suffice. But those
who invest all their energies and hopes in an undertaking even
tinged with depravity are bound to its success and are apt to
acquire an obscure self-contempt which qualifies their faith,
first in their fellows, and then in themselves.’
Discontent and paranoia become the norm. Enjoyment of the
present dries up; everything is sacrificed to the vision of
a plentiful tomorrow. The diverse small enjoyments of life
are long forgotten and the citizens of Babel hang around
listlessly waiting for the promised abundance, prey to all
sorts of doubts. Are they being duped? When the ascent into
heaven comes, will some be left out? Or will something go
wrong, making a mockery of their lives spent in one huge
effort?
Eventually, in a fit of mass paranoia, the citizens of
Babel storm the Tower. Heavy with their weight and shaking
with the thunder of their feet, the Tower comes crashing down.
Everyone is destroyed, even the little crippled boy who
could not keep up.
I said earlier that the theme of this essay was,
‘The outcome of trying to make the state a paradise
has always been to turn it into a hell’.
Oakeshott appends a poetical version of this sentence at
the end of his Tower of Babel essay:
'Those who in the Elysian fields would dwell
This final collapse is only one moral of the story.
The other moral, more pertinent perhaps to our present
condition, is the hell it creates along the way. Long
before it destroys itself, its citizens are living in
a hell of dissatisfactions.
As a coda to this tracing of Oakeshott’s ideas on the
project of modernity, I want to quote from another late
essay, ‘A Place of Learning’. In this essay, first presented
here at Colorado College in 1974, Oakeshott ties in the
problems faced by educators
with the problems we humans face more generally.
‘The world in which many children now grow up,’
he writes, ‘is crowded, not necessarily with occupants
and not at all with memorable experiences, but with happenings;
it is a ceaseless flow of seductive trivialities which invoke
neither reflection nor choice but instant participation.
A child quickly becomes aware that he cannot too soon plunge
into this flow or immerse himself in it too quickly;
to pause is to be swept with the chilling fear of never
having lived at all. This world has but one language,
soon learned; the language of appetite.’
To that he might have added, quoting Shakespeare:
‘And appetite, an universal wolf, must make perforce
an universal prey, and last eat up himself.’
by Ivo Mosley
Introduction.
‘Now we have had our Theatre of the Absurd, our Theatre of Cruelty,
our Theatre of Violence, we may want to remember the actors who, against all opposing forces, built together a theatre of feeling, a theatre of the heart.’
Although Yiddish theatre is often cited as a progenitor of
American musical theatre, little mention is made of it in
the standard reference books. For instance in ‘The Cambridge
Companion to the Musical’ it is mentioned only once in passing
and it has no entry in the index.
This might seem an anomaly, given that the main creative movers
and shakers in Musical Theatre were (and are) Jewish; that many of them got their start in American Yiddish theatre; and that of all Musical Theatre’s precursors, Yiddish theatre is most similar to it in form, style and content. Furthermore, many interesting comparisons cry out to be made between the two, mostly to the advantage of Yiddish theatre - as I hope to show.
Yiddish Language and Literature.
Yiddish has a thousand-year history and was spoken by an
estimated 13 million people in 1939. Like English it grew
out of Old German, and as it developed it picked up words
from many other languages - from Hebrew, Aramaic, Slav,
Polish, Russian and the Romance languages.
Aaron Lansky (who in 1980 began to collect Yiddish books to
save them for posterity) describes Yiddish as a ‘chronicle
of every place the Jews have been; a fusion of outside elements
into a Jewish way of thinking and a Jewish way of seeing the world.’
It was the main spoken language of Jews in Central Europe and the
Russian ‘Pale’ (the area of Russia in which Jews were permitted to live).
Hebrew was their language of religion, and also of serious literature
until the nineteenth century, when Mendele ‘took pity on the orphan
Yiddish’ and began writing in the vernacular. After Mendele, a veritable
explosion of activity took place - poetry, essays, stories, novels and
drama.
Yiddish literature, for most of its history, remained the
exclusive property of Yiddish-speakers. Not only was Yiddish
disregarded by the outside world; it was looked down on by many
‘progressive’ Jewish movements. Zionism, for instance, ‘saw
Yiddish as the backward-looking language of the shtetl’ , and
in 1873 Heinrich Graez, German Jewish author of a 6-volume history
of the Jews, ‘accorded Yiddish just two paragraphs. Never mind that
it was the first or only language of 80% of the world’s Jews; for
Graez, it was ‘eine halbtierische Sprache,’ a 'half-bestial tongue.’
The Explosion of Yiddish Theatre
Yiddish theatre has a more-or-less official birthday: October 5th
1876, when Avrom Goldfaden presented a two-act play in the garden
of the Green Tree café in Jassy, Romania. Over the next decade,
Yiddish theatre spread like wildfire; to Russia (where it was soon
banned), back through Central Europe to London, and then across the
Atlantic to the Americas. By 1914 there were 22 Yiddish theatres and
two Yiddish vaudeville houses in New York alone.
At the start of its history, two characteristics of Yiddish
theatre stand out: high-mindedness, and a commitment to music
integral with the drama. The high-mindedness manifested itself
as a determination on the part of writers and actors not to give
in to the appetite of the uneducated masses for any old entertainment.
On the contrary, Goldfaden was determined to give Yiddish-speakers
a theatre that would raise their level of understanding and that
they could be proud of. Later, and particularly in the United
States, high-mindedness would have to fight hard against the
commercialist impulse to forget about high ideals and provide
nothing but shund (trash). However, the fight was never entirely
lost, and some of Yiddish theatre’s greatest works found their
first audiences in the United States.
The commitment to music was, by and large, shared by writers,
producers and audience alike. It was just assumed - where there
was theatre, there would also be music and song. ‘It was an
inseparable part of the Yiddish theatre, and many songs originally
written for the stage passed into popular consciousness as folk
melodies,’ writes David Mazower .
Goldfaden wrote music as well as words for his plays, many of
which became classics. Other writers for the classic Yiddish
stage also wrote their own music; Peretz included written-out
tunes in his scripts and Hirshbein would ‘sit at the piano picking
out his melodies’. Almost always the arrangements were undertaken
by others.
Yiddish Theatre as a Last Flowering of the European Tradition.
Yiddish literature flourished as a European literature, but outside
the mainstream. Today it is unknown to most readers, Jews and non-Jews
alike. Where it was able to flourish (anti-Semitism continually
threatened its existence in Europe) it explored themes of identity
and modernity mostly unregulated by those who, for instance,
objected to either positive or negative portrayals of Jews being
broadcast, or who believed modernity was an unrelieved blessing.
To a great extent, its language was its protection.
Themes such as female emancipation, sexual freedom, tradition
versus innovation, the perils of affluence, and the irrationality
of believing in a loving God are explored with a freshness and a
freedom unfamiliar in the mainstream tradition. And always the
demand for comedy and song grounds the drama in the urge to
celebrate life, come what may.
If my experience is anything to go by, the first impression
of an outsider upon reading Yiddish literature is likely to
be astonishment at its outrageousness. No pretension is left
unmocked; no value is left unscrutinized; no social group is
immune from assault.
This might suggest moral nihilism; yet the opposite is true.
In his introduction to The Dybbuk and Other Great Yiddish Plays,
Joseph C. Landis says the positive moral value of Yiddish theatre
is the concept of mentshlekhkayt. This is an attitude towards what
is admirable in being human: a positive valuation on compassion,
gentleness, kindliness and modesty; a negative valuation on violence,
arrogance, pretension and the will to power. ‘The Ashkenazic Jew’s
aversion of violence was not based on any sentimental exaltation of
weakness or of the ‘power of powerlessness,’ but on a principled
repudiation of force as bestializing and on a faith in the ultimate
victory of reason and morality.’
This positive value of what humanity should aspire to is consistent
with what is most admirable in the European tradition. It is consonant
with Aristotle’s idea of ‘the good’, with the medieval concept of
chivalry, with humanist values implicit in Shakespeare, Montaigne and
Goethe - and of course with the ethical world-picture of that master
of European musical theatre, Mozart.
Within the pages of classic Yiddish theatre, all authority and
power that goes against the high ideal of mentshlekhkayt is brought to
critical book. Oppressors of Jews and heroic Jewish resistance-fighters
are frequent villains and heroes in historical pieces. But so too are
abusers of Rabbinical power and the freethinkers they oppress; one
play revived again and again was a translation of Gutzkow’s Uriel
Acosta, about a Portuguese Jew so humiliated for his free-thinking
by the Rabbis of Amsterdam that he committed suicide.
This emphasis upon individual moral freedom is one reason for
claiming that Yiddish theatre is the last great flowering of the
European tradition. Another is its resistance to the growing
totalitarian ethic that was being fostered under the general
term ‘enlightenment’.
The Enlightenment
The Enlightenment (Haskalah in Hebrew; haskole in Yiddish) was a
new approach to working out the age-old problem of how humanity
should govern itself. It held out a promise to all peoples: only
desert your old separatist ways of religion and superstition and
we can all live together in a new atmosphere of toleration,
fairness and mutual appreciation.
This promise pulled in one direction on the Jewish community,
calling it to assimilate; the folk mysticism of the Hasidic
movement and of more ancient and established religious traditions
were pulling it in another. Another ‘modern’ pull was in the
direction of socialism; the universal brotherhood of man, that
would arrive once fairness in the distribution of wealth had
been imposed by political force.
In opposition to this were philosophers (represented
by Hobbes and Montesquieu) who said that the law should
impartially and indifferently preserve the peace without
favouring any group or interest. This position was reformist
rather than revolutionary; the law should no longer discriminate
in favour of the ruling group, race or class. Under this umbrella
of impartial law any number of peoples and groups would be able
to flourish, their differences unthreatened and intact. This approach recognised human diversity as inevitable - and possibly even desirable. But this vision of things lost out.
Yiddish Theatre and ‘The Enlightenment’
Yiddish literature had a special relationship with ‘The Enlightenment’ because the murderousness at the heart of the Enlightenment manifested itself towards Yiddish-speakers from early on. Voltaire, Diderot and other vocal leaders of the movement were openly and vehemently anti-Semitic.
The belief that progress, science and rationalism would bring about a modern Utopia necessitated a certain amount of social engineering, and social engineers are always faced with the problem of what to do with people who don’t want to be engineered. Many Enlightenment thinkers believed that laws stigmatising Jews should be abolished, and in some countries they were abolished (after bitter arguments), but the other side of the bargain was that the Jews had to integrate. Voltaire, Diderot and many other anti-Semites thought the Jews were incapable of integration.
‘The mainstream of the thinking of the Enlightenment,’ writes historian Arthur Hertzberg, ‘led by Voltaire, was absolutist. It imagined itself as a positive force for the making of a new world, and everyone had to be remade in order to be part of the new heaven. The particular disaster of the Jew was that the men of the Enlightenment were not entirely certain that he could enter the heaven even after he was remade.’
Yiddish-speaking Jews, for the most part, had no desire to be remade. Voltaire’s vehement and frequently-expressed anti-Semitism was reflected in the actions of pogromists against Yiddish-speaking Jews, often instigated and led by members of the East European and Russian educated elite.
Figures standing out against this anti-Semitism, such as Montesquieu in France, Alexander II of Russia and Emperor Franz Josef of Austria , stood also in opposition to the Enlightenment. Montesquieu proposed that the law, and the authority of the state, should be used to establish a condition of peace, not as a tool for utopian social engineering.
Attitudes towards the Enlightenment opened a gap between Yiddish-speaking (mostly impoverished) Jews and wealthier more assimilated Jews, who mostly spoke the language of their host nation and who hoped (with some anxiety, it must be said ) to be accepted into the European mainstream.
This gap was in turn reflected in the consistent hostility of many non-Yiddish speaking Jews towards Yiddish theatre.
Yiddish Theatre as a Critic of Modernity.
Yiddish theatre is the one body of work that represents a truly intelligent and creative opposition to the negative aspects of the Enlightenment.
The Utopian belief in progress, science and rationalism has in many ways become the dominant and undisputed belief of our time. At the same time, millions of words are expended every year upon the vacuousness of this Utopia as we see it realised in our contemporary world.
In many ways, modern theatre represents various reactions to this vacuousness (theatres of cruelty, the absurd, panic, ‘political’ theatre etc, etc); but it has little to offer except recognition, protest and despair. Yiddish theatre, in contrast, elaborates the positive ethic which opposed the drift to modernity as it was taking place. In addition, it presented a vision of the particular - the Yiddish world in all its diversity - that the absolutism of modernity would - and did - suppress.
To illustrate this, I want to briefly examine three plays as they relate to what we might as well call ‘the modernity project’.
1: Peretz’s A Night in the Old Marketplace
I.L. Peretz (1852-1915) was one of the three early masters of Yiddish literature (the others were Mendele and Sholem Aleichem).
Peretz began his intellectual life as a supporter of the Enlightenment. However, as he witnessed ‘the recklessness with which a new generation was quitting what centuries of Jewish civilization had so painstakingly and with such sacrifice accumulated’ he ‘came to the paradoxical view that in order to continue to improve the material lot of the Jews, he would have to continue to nurture their spiritual-religious heritage’ .
As time wore on it became obvious, continues Ruth Wisse, that there was ‘not a shred of evidence’ to suggest that the Enlightenment was leading to a new harmony of peoples. ‘Instead, anti-Semitism became an effective tool of nationalist politics, while the revolutionary movements insisted that Jews be the avant-garde of the new International.’ In other words, the proposed liberation of humanity was turning into a struggle for control of its future - and Jews were only to be admitted if they could re-invent themselves.
Peretz’s creative reaction was twofold. On the one hand, he wrote an autobiography unfolding his vision of a fruitful life as the outcome of tensions between tradition and rebellion, morality and transgression, selfishness and duty - much as Chaim Potok did half a century later with Asher Lev, reflecting an ‘eagerness to be part of the secular adventure of modern man and at the same time not vanish as a minority group.’ (This eagerness would find greatly enhanced possibilities of fulfilment - both in Israel and in the Diaspora - after the establishment of the Jewish state; but that was not to be in Peretz’s lifetime.)
On the other hand, Peretz wrote what Max Reinhardt called ‘a rare specimen of a universalist-symbolist play’ , A Night in the Old Marketplace.
To read this play today is to be taken into another world - the world of middle-European Jewry - presented with love and humour but without sentimentality. The play is universalist in the same way that Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice, rooted in Georgian England, appeals to any human being with an open heart. It is symbolist in that the characters represent not individuals but the dynamic, conflicting essentials that make up a living community of human souls.
The characters are not named, but typed; there is a Poet, a Jester, a Wanderer, a Recluse, a Drunk; there are choruses of Girls, of Frightened Shadows, of Church Statues come to life; there is a Cantor, a Prostitute, a Hussar. All these characters speak together and interact in ways reflecting the historical reality of the time Peretz lived through. The result is a drama of true human characters, but symbolic characters.
At the centre of the action stands an old well, terrifying in its symbolism because the monstrous gargoyle standing guard over it once grabbed an entire band of passing musicians and drowned them in it.
Whatever the symbolism, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Peretz was trying to immortalize, in his last and most personally cherished work, a community and way of life that he deeply loved and which he saw was under terrible threat of extinction.
Zichron Ya’akov, whose translation of A Night in the Old Marketplace was published in 1990, had this to say about it: ‘Let it be the 1990’s answer to the 1960’s Fiddler on the Roof, that charmingly mawkish sentimentalisation of the shtetl that appealed to every self-congratulatory piety of contemporary Jewish life. If there is any one message that runs through Peretz’s work, of which A Night in the Old Markeplace is undoubtedly the crowning achievment, it is that nothing smells worse than unlanced piety.’
Specific tunes are written out by Peretz for use in A Night in the Old Marketplace and where tunes are not specified, consistent versification suggests through-composition. A satisfactory performance would require extremely high levels of direction, set-design and musical arrangement.
2: Jacob Gordin’s God, Man and Devil.
Jacob Gordin (1853-1909) was the first playwright of great quality to make his mark and develop in the United States. He wrote God, Man and Devil in 1900.
A quick resume: the play starts in heaven with two groups of angels singing platitudes of an almost New Age dreariness. God turns up, utters a quick platitude to appease the angels, then asks for Satan as if he is a favourite pupil at a yeshiva. Satan tells the audience that heaven is desperately boring; ‘one moment in the life of a weak little man is more interesting than a mighty God’s whole eternity’.
Satan and God then have an extended conversation about how dreary humanity has become. God agrees with Satan: ‘the enlightened up-to-date human being’ is a disappointment.
God says there is still one human on earth he is fond of. Satan bets he can corrupt him along with all the others. God allows the bet, and after another dreary angelic platitude we are glad to be back on earth to witness the contest.
Briefly, the man - Hershele Dubrovner - lives in poverty with his old, infertile wife and two nieces. Satan is going to corrupt him with affluence. He engineers a lottery win - this is tricky, for Hershele never plays the lottery.
As soon as the money arrives, the problems begin. Hershele’s niece is now too grand to marry her penniless suitor. Old friends become unwelcome. So far, this follows the plot of Sholem Aleichem’s The Big Win, but whereas that play ends happily - the protagonist is diddled out of his money and returns to poverty with a sense of relief - this is to be a tragedy.
To make sure his work is done, Satan hangs around Hershele in the person of a financial advisor, a character translated by Nahma Sandrow as ‘Mischief’. Mischief’s speeches are masterpieces of rationalist justification for Hershele’s behaviour. Hershele divorces his devoted old wife to marry his beautiful niece. Gordin’s genius is to make Hershele’s actions conform to both secular and religious law; yet they are against all that we know instinctively to be good. That is, they are against the values of mentshlekhkayt, the values that made Hershele God’s favourite.
Here is a sample: the Devil is telling Hershele to declare himself bankrupt; that way he can swindle his creditors and get even richer:
‘From such a fine, decent man as Reb Hershele, the creditors will happily accept fifty kopecks on the ruble. In business, being decent means being smart, taking as much as possible in and giving as little as possible out.’
To cut a long story short, Hershele betrays everyone who loves him. He fills his world increasingly with misery, hate, and physical and mental suffering. At the last, he kills himself. It is this act of suicide that loses Satan his bet, for the act proves that Herschele still has a soul.
The play cannot but remind one of The Threepenny Opera whose characters are similarly degraded by greed and pursuit of money. But whereas the main motif in The Threepenny Opera is that humanity is universally corrupt, Gordin never lets us forget that Hershele was a good man, and making a good life for those around him, until the values of rationalism, appetite and affluence corrupted him.
There are some indications of what music should be played during God, Man and Devil. The symbol of everything good in Hershele’s life is musical; at key moments in the play (including just before his suicide) he plays the Psalm ‘God is my shepherd’ on his violin. Music is also idiocy and fun; Hershele’s drunken father sings a lot and at one point Gordin specifies ‘traditional tune’ for a wedding lament. We are told in Bright Star of Exile that Gordin insisted the music in his plays be appropriate; and in the same book, that Jacob Adler, the actor/manager who championed Gordin, liked musical underscoring to accompany much of the action. Presumably this underscoring was worked out by the musical director in consultation with writer and management.
3. Sholem Asch’s God of Vengeance
God of Vengeance is interesting because it is the only Yiddish play that is still regularly performed in English translation. It is also one of the very few Yiddish plays that has no absolute internal requirement for music: I have included it for consideration because it provides us with an opportunity to consider the essential difference between Yiddish theatre and the contemporary musical from an ethical/aesthetic standpoint.
God of Vengeance’s attraction for present-day producers is that familiar box-office draw and token of modernity, the on-stage transgressive sexual ‘moment’. And that ‘moment’ is indeed theatrically stunning. When it was first put on in English on Broadway in 1923, the entire cast and company were locked up in jail.
Briefly, it concerns an overbearing Jewish brothel-owner, a huge personality who is determined that something pure and sacred will survive his tarnished calling. And that something is the innocence of his young daughter, a beautiful and impulsive young woman just reaching marriageable age.
He is convinced of the girl’s innocence and so are we. She is allowed a very limited friendship with just one of the prostitutes downstairs; meanwhile marriage is being arranged for her with a rabbi’s son from a nearby town. There is a cynical acknowledgement that this marriage would not be possible were the brothel-owner not also extremely rich.
The sexual ‘moment’ occurs when, left alone (but still talking about the wedding to her mother off-stage), the daughter engages the prostitute in a passionate lesbian kiss. On this kiss the First Act curtain falls.
During the second act, the marriage plans unravel; the daughter runs off with her prostitute friend and a pimp to be the star turn in a brothel some distance away. But the point of the play is not the shock value of the kiss, nor sadness at the daughter’s direction in life; on the contrary, the prostitutes seem lively and content. The point is the crazy, desperate need of the brothel-owner for something higher than the exploitation he has grown rich on.
God of Vengeance, dealing with moral corruption, suggests comparison with the modern-day musical Chicago. The advertisement for Chicago tell us what it is about, and primes us on how to enjoy it: ‘MURDER! GREED! CORRUPTION! EXPLOITATION! ADULTERY! TREACHERY!’ stretch out in huge letters, sometimes stretching a hundred yards or so across on giant billboards.
Of course, this does not mean we actually approve of such things; it just means we pride ourselves on a knowingness that they go on, a sophistication in accepting them. The civilized audience knows all too well that Western affluence is heavily involved with acceptance of those values, and by going to the theatre our communal unease is alleviated somewhat. Such knowingness, however, has never been thought to constitute great art, and for good reason.
Art and Shund in American Yiddish Theatre
Because of censorship and persecutions in Europe, New York was soon the world centre for Yiddish Theatre. By 1905 it was a flourishing international phenomenon with its own theatres (as politics and markets permitted) in London, Kiev, Bucharest, Buenos Aires, South Africa, Australia, Warsaw, Latvia, Romania (the list goes on and on) and tours to outlying Yiddish-speaking communities all over the world.
‘Because the Lower East Side had the most enegetic and prosperous Yiddish community of the time, and one of the most densely clustered, it was here that styles of production, writing and acting were established, to be exported to every other Yiddish-speaking community in the world.’
The word in Yiddish for commercial trash is ‘shund’. The conflict between art and shund, so familiar today, was significant in Yiddish theatre in Europe but became even more so in America, where the star system dominated. Some stars (Boris Thomashevsky) were happy by and large to ‘give the public what it wants’ no matter how shund-like; but David Kessler and Jacob Adler both railed against the tyranny of shund.
Commercialism is not simply the desire to make money - who doesn’t have that? - nor even the desire to make as much money as possible. It is a social and ethical disease, consisting of contempt for all activity not geared to making as much money as possible, and a conviction that any other set of values is an affront to the general vanity. To do anything not for the maximum amount of money becomes a sin, an idiocy, something ‘not done’ or taboo. It is the main reason why greatness has had such a hard time flourishing in the United States, where there is plenty of very good entertainment but nowhere a repetition of the rough-edged greatness of Gordin.
‘The Yiddish masses loved theater’ writes Nahma Sandrow in her delightful and pioneering book ‘Vagabond Stars’. ‘They ate, as the saying went, their broyt mit teater - their bread with theater.’ In New York in the 1890’s the Yiddish-speaking community was three hundred thousand strong. Most were desperately poor, working long hours in sweatshops or peddling rags and pins. Between them they supported several large theatres, several music halls, tens of little cabarets and amateur drama clubs: ‘their appetite for theater was astounding.’
In New York, Yiddish theatres were managed by their stars, who competed to live like kings. ‘When Thomasefsky played King Solomon, the quip was that the only difference between him and the real king was that Solomon had to support his harem, whereas the actor’s harem supported him.’ Wild celebrity-worship attended the stars, much as it did in the early days of Kabuki in Japan and European opera in the eighteenth century.
Competing celebrity would also manifest itself on stage. ‘Once, when Kessler, Adler and Thomasefsky (the big three) all happened to be playing together, their personal feuding created a whole new play. Evidently Kessler started the fight by mimicking Thomashefsky while they were onstage. At that moment in the scene, which took place in a kitchen, Thomashefsky was supposed to throw a plate on the ground and break it, but he was irritated enough to break two. Kesler, not to be upstaged, broke a few himself - both of them continuing with the dialogue as written all the while. Adler was supposed to be playing a quiet gentle old rabbi, but he refused to be left out, so he, too, started breaking plates. By the end of the act all the plates lay in shattered bits on the stage and the three were starting to smash the furniture. The crowd loved it.’
All this gave a kind of life to the theatre that is absent now from any theatre one can think of. But what effect did it have on the content of the theatre - the plays and the music?
In New York, the demand was for novelty; playwrights good and bad turned out plays in their hundreds. Hurwitz wrote one a week for thirty years. This kind of productivity is not without precedent: early Spanish playwrights wrote plays in their thousands, Lope de Vega boasting that many of his passed ‘from brain to boards in twenty-four hours’. This kind of febrile activity relates to the size of the theatre’s constituency, that is to say potential audience numbers: if the same audience has to be drawn in week after week - or even night after night - only a certain number of performances of each play are possible. (We have the reverse situation in musical theatre now, where a few dominate with very few new works - and quality is even rarer).
But knowledge of the difference between art and entertainment was alive and well among the practitioners. David Kessler, one of Yiddish theater’s greatest stars, would stand with his back to the audience muttering savage asides to his fellow actors about the idiotic dialogue demanded of him by his audience.
Shund was thrown together from any material that would delight the audience - songs, skits, dance numbers, comedy turns, scenes thrown together from other works, often stolen from rivals (copyright was hard to enforce in those days). Then there was sentimental fare, domestic comedies about marriage, self-sacrifice. High-class shund consisted of serious subjects from religion or history treated as mass entertainment without much respect for the integrity or significance of the subject.
As for more serious efforts, many playwrights were busy at work. Gordin wrote ‘about seventy plays, a dozen of them masterpieces’. His last play was called Dementia Americana and its subject was precisely the disease of commercialism. It was a flop. After Gordin’s death, the battle raged between art and shund; good plays were produced, but greatness was spurned. Even Sholem Aleichem, the grand old master of Yiddish literature and one of the most popular writers on the planet, could not get his plays performed on the New York stage. He complained that American managers treated plays like cattle-dealers treat carcasses.
Yiddish Theatre and the American Musical
‘While America has promised us equality, we have mistaken the notion of equality for something quite different: sameness.’
- Theodore Bikel, introducton to ‘Mir Trogen a Gesang’.
If we accept that the American Musical came of age in 1926 with Showboat, there is considerable overlap between it and the heyday of Yiddish Theatre.
Both theatres depended heavily upon Jewish writers, producers and performers. Many actors were playing on both stages, Yiddish and English; the most extraordinary account perhaps is of Jacob Adler playing Shylock on Broadway in 1903, speaking his lines in Yiddish while the rest of the cast performed in English. His Shyock was judged to be even greater than Sir Henry Irving’s.
During those early days, mainstream critics such as Lincoln Steffens agreed that Yiddish theatre was the most exciting and adventurous in New York. While the Yiddish theatre performed translations of Ibsen, Tolstoy, Schiller, Strindberg and Shaw as well as its own newly-written classics, Broadway was presenting a diet of sentimental operettas with names like Alias Jimmy Valentine and The Heart of Maryland. Yiddish actors were growing rich and famous and some were the best-loved members of their communities; when Jacob Adler died, an estimated half-million people turned out to honour him during his two days lying in state.
Twenty years later, Yiddish audiences were declining. Immigration restrictions on Jews were imposed in 1922; the Yiddish community itself was growing affluent and dispersing to the suburbs; many Yiddish-speakers were dropping their Yiddish identity and assimilating. Meanwhile the American theatre was inventing itself along two separate lines; the serious play, pioneered by Eugene O’Neill, and the musical, pioneered mostly by English-speaking children of Yiddish-speaking parents like Irving Berling and the Gershwins.
The rise of the American musical was concurrent with this period of struggle in the Yiddish theatre. Several points can be noted when comparing the two:
1. The influence of jazz became stronger in the musical, whereas Jewish folk and liturgical melody remained dominant in the Yiddish theatre.
2. Whereas the American musical was required to be a celebration of ‘America’, Yiddish theatre was free to celebrate or mock as it pleased, protected from political and social pressure to behave by the barrier of language.
3. To the extent that ‘art’ could survive ‘shund’ in the American musical, it would have to accommodate itself to the American Dream. The American public does not tolerate criticism of its guiding principles.
For many decades, only the gentlest of criticism of the Dream could pass the test of popular taste. When, finally, serious scrutiny of the American Dream was allowed - as, say, in Rent - historical amnesia was such that there was nothing positive to offer in its place. In the case of Sondheim (where once again one is hard-put to find a positive ethic) his critical stance ensured he would never gain popular appeal.
‘The Yiddish theatre was in every sense a people’s or community theatre, that is to say a true theatre, the like of which was rarely if ever to be achieved again in our country’ says Harold Clurman in his introduction to ‘Bright Star of Exile’. American theatre, in contrast, compartmentalised itself early into ‘serious theatre’ and ‘music theatre’. ‘Serious theatre’, deprived of music, became heavy, pugnacious and indigestible; music theatre, devoted to pleasing the masses, is hobbled in any role of recreating civilization.
The Decline of Yiddish and its Literature.
Sometimes it is a mystery why a creative tradition declines. For instance, Moses Finley could offer no explanation as to why, after 200 BC, ‘sixteen centuries of Hellenic civilization produced no poet as good as Theocritus, no scientist as good as Eratosthenes’.
There is no such mystery, however, about the decline of Yiddish literature. Three factors stand out.
First, Hitler’s Germans exterminated writers and audiences alike in Central Europe. In the Holocaust, nearly half the Yiddish-speaking population of the world was killed.
Secondly, Stalin crippled the Yiddish theatre with political censorship and murder later (in the 1950’s) had all the leading Yiddish writers shot.
Third, emigrating Yiddish-speakers were keen to assimilate in their new homelands. No doubt the exterminations in Europe were a terrible warning of the perils of maintaining a conspicuously separate identity. Immigrant children in England and America grew up speaking English; the only groups keeping Yiddish alive - Hassidic communities - disapproved of theatre and of the kind of freely critical debate that permeates Yiddish literature.
In Israel - the other main destination for Jews seeking refuge and a new life - the speaking and use of Yiddish was strongly discouraged until about 1975; Hebrew was the approved language of the new Jewish State. Since then, official tolerance of Yiddish has been followed by a re-appraisal of Yiddish theatre and, perhaps, the beginnings of a second birth.
In explaining why there is so little awareness of Yiddish literature among Jews or Gentiles of the present day, Aaron Lansky suggests that perhaps its abrupt decline tarnished Yiddish literature with a sense of being an unlucky quantity. ‘Look how Yiddish literature ended up,’ he writes, ‘its world in ruins, its writers murdered, its readers dying, its children estranged.’
Other writers mention that for those Yiddish-speakers still alive after 1945, the overwhelming experience of Yiddish culture - the Holocaust - seemed hardly a subject for dramatic presentation. Surviving writers in Yiddish explored its implications in poetry.
These facts, many of them so unbearable to contemplate, go some way to account for the present neglect of Yiddish literature in general and theatre in particular. But this neglect is a sad one, for Yiddish literature and theatre uniquely contain a profound and varied critique of modernity - in particular, of those aspects of modernity that threaten civilization in our present day.
As our modern world marches relentlessly on, its corporate armies destroying the world and all our futures, its ethical mandarins substituting all good things - art, nature, individuality, freedom - with mockeries of themselves, it is precisely the voices of Yiddish literature (modernity’s first victims) that we have most to learn from. They asserted a common human ethic beyond religion, beyond law, beyond prescription; the ethic of humanity, tolerance, respect for what is good, and justice.
Bibliography
There are notoriously few books on, and translations from, Yiddish in English. There is also very little material on the use of music in Yiddish theatre, only scattered references in more general works. Similarly difficult to trace are the many connections between famous writers and performers in English-language theatre and the Yiddish stage.
There are however (at least) two wonderful books on the extraordinary story of Yiddish theatre, by Nahma Sandrow and Lulla Rosenfeld.
I.B. Singer and Sholem Asch are the two most extensively translated Yiddish writers, both of whom wrote mostly fiction. Not a single Goldfaden play is available in translation, and only one by Jacob Gordin.
Primary:
Asch’s God of Vengeance is in:
The Dybbuk and Other Great Yiddish Plays translated and introduced by Joseph C. Landis (Bantam Books, New York 1966).
Peretz’s A Night in the Old Marketplace is in:
The I.L. Peretz Reader, ed. and introduction by Ruth. L. Wisse (Yale University Press, New Haven USA 2002).
Gordin’s God, Man and Devil is in:
God, Man and Devil: Yiddish Plays in Translation by Nahma Sandrow (Syracuse University Press, 1999).
Sholem Aleichem’s The Jackpot (also known as The Big Win) is in:
The Jackpot: A Folk-Play in Four Acts by Sholem Aleichem. Translated by Kobi Weitzner and Barnett Zumoff. Workmen’s Circle Education Department, New York, 1989.
The Music of Abraham Goldfaden by Irene Heskes (Tara Publications, USA 1990) allows a reasonably competent pianist to work through 50 songs and lyrics by Goldfaden, father of Yiddish theatre. Many compilation Jewish and Yiddish songbooks also contain versions of Yiddish theatre songs.
Secondary:
Bright Star of Exile by Lulla Rosenfeld (Barrie & Jenkins, London 1977) tells the extraordinary life story of Jacob Adler, star of the early Yiddish stage.
Vagabond Stars by Nahma Sandrow (Harper & Row, New York, 1977) tells vividly the history of Yiddish Theatre.
A History of Yiddish Literature by Sil Liptzin (Jonathan David, New York, 1972) has excellent chapters on theatre, though most space is devoted to fiction and poetry.
Outwitting History by Aaron Lansky (Algonquin Books, Carolina, USA 2005) tells of the rescue of a-million-and-a-half-and-counting Yiddish books.
Dictionary of Jewish Lore and Legend by Alan Unterman (Thames & Hudson, London 1991) is excellent as a source-book for imaginative Ashkenazic elaborations of traditional Jewish themes.
Yiddish Theatre in London by David Mazower: The Jewish Museum, London, 1996.
Wanderings by Chaim Potok (Fawcett Crest, New York, 1978), a fascinating history of the Jewish people, explores the Enlightenment as a potentially and actually anti-Semitic movement, as does:
The French Enlightenment and the Jews: The Origins of Modern Anti-Semitism by Arthur Hertzberg: Schocken Books, New York, 1970.
George Gershwin: His Life and Music by Ean Wood: Sanctuary Publishing, London 1996 has a few details of the composer’s early relations with the Yiddish theatre.
for the DAILY MAIL
Chasing the Molecule by John Buckingham
.
ESSAYS
(click on title to view)
'A New Dark Age of Barbaric Affluence'
- a talk given at the 2006 Michael Oakeshott Conference,
- an essay for the Goldsmiths MA course in Musical Theatre
BOOK REVIEWS
(click on title to view)
Chasing the Molecule, by John Buckingham.
God Has Not Changed, by Alice Thomas Ellis.
BACK TO HOME PAGE
a paper by Ivo Mosley
for the Michael Oakeshott Association Conference, Colorado Springs, 2006.
Do but extend the boundaries of hell.'
Yiddish Theatre: More Than Just a Progenitor
an essay, 2006.
Lulla Rosenfeld, ‘Bright Star of Exile’.
REVIEWS
A review by Ivo Mosley.
Chemistry! The very word is enough to fill most of us with dread. How did the
magic of the first chemistry lesson - brightly burning magnesium ribbon, clear
liquids turning magically cloudy when mixed, stink gas made from hydrogen and
sulphur - turn to the tedium of trying to remember how many carbon atoms there
are in ethyl alcohol?
Well John Buckingham manages in this book to stay with the magic. And he has
other ingredients too - the fascinating lives and circumstances of those who
made the discoveries. There was a time when serious books were not meant to
include the bizarre characters of the great, the good and the bad that crowd
our histories; not any more, thank goodness, for strange habits of mind, even
odd sexualities, seem indispensably implicated in the struggle for knowledge
and achievment. Chicanery, self-delusion, power mania and vanity are everywhere
bound up in ambition.
This book is full of wonderful vignettes, like the Glaswegian Dr Ure trying to
resurrect the corpse of a murderer by electricity. 'Every muscle in his
countenance was thrown into fearful action. Rage, horror, despair, anguish and
ghastly smiles united in their hideous expression in the murderer's face
at this point, several of the spectators were forced to leave the apartment
from terror or sickness and one gentleman fainted.'
Chemistry emerged from alchemy and was a victory for rationality over
superstition. There is still a huge gulf between minds that think
scientifically and those that believe in whatever sounds spookily right, and
each is apt to hold the other in contempt. Yet often minds of each description
will co-inhabit the same house, the same marriage - even the same person. And
thus it was in the early chemists; torn between superstition and reason,
lacking the tools to further their understanding, it was fantastically
difficult for them to arrive at the simple concepts - valency, equivalent
weights, the molecule - which underlie modern chemistry.
Educationalists are always wondering how to make science more interesting for
those who are never going to be scientists. I wonder if they might take a leaf
out of this book and teach not science but history of science. The chase is
always more interesting than the victory. And these tales of all-too-human
curiosity give some meaning to science beyond mere utility, of which we are all
heartily sick and tired.
A review by Ivo Mosley.
Roll up for the greatest story ever told! At last, science describes the
creation of the universe! Well, not quite
on creation as most of us
understand it, science is silent. It has no better explanation of how a
universe appears out of nothing than you or I, and scientists are just as
likely to bring God into the story. What science
can
describe, however, is what happened
after
energy, matter, time and space appeared in a mysterious cosmic event of
unimaginable power and intensity billions of years ago. And it is this search
to understand this that Simon Singh describes in riveting detail. As in all the
best popular science, wonderful human characters emerge from the page,
reminding us that science is a human endeavour, not a progress of calculating
robots.
It really is an adventure story, and one of the great ones. Singh starts with
the early Greek natural philosophers whose subtle investigations launched a
whole new way of understanding the world. Instead of looking at the heavens and
making up fabulous stories (though the Greeks were pretty good at that too)
they began answering questions using theory and measurement. Is the Earth a
sphere? How far away are the Moon and the Sun? I was astonished to learn that,
in 250 BC, a genius called Eratosthenes estimated the Earth's circumference to
an accuracy of about 2%.
With the decline of Greek civilization and the rise of Rome, science went into
eclipse; Rome was more interested in power and administration. When the spirit
of enquiry re-emerged a thousand years later, the big question was 'Is the Sun
or the Earth the centre of the Universe?' The main enemy of scientific enquiry
then was the powerful Church, which did not want its dogma contradicted.
Scientists moved between royal patrons and often worked in passionate
obscurity. Wonderful characters come to life. Perhaps most remarkable was Tycho
Brahe, who lost his nose in a duel and had a brass one glued on, good enough to
pass for real. His laboratory, built with Royal funding, consumed more than 5%
of Denmark's GNP and was famous for its wild parties. His pet elk died after
falling down stairs while drunk.
Then came Galileo who shifted things up a gear by using the telescope, which
gave him access to more - and more accurate - data. Getting data is always a
big problem for cosmologists; you can have all the theories in the world but
you need data to test them with. The cosmos is remote and inaccessible; you
cannot put the sun in a test tube, do different things to it and watch what
happens. So cosmology relies on small-scale experiments here on earth, on
patient measurements of heavenly movement, and on theories dreamed up in
inspired human brains. Using all of these, Galileo confirmed that the earth
revolves around the sun. He was punished for his achievement by being put under
indefinite house arrest; but this came as a relief, for some inquisitors were
arguing he should be tortured and killed.
Moving over many fascinating tales we come to the final question; is the
universe eternal and self-sustaining or did it appear all-at-once, in a moment
of creation - the moment now known as Big Bang? Two conditions of Big Bang
theory are that the Universe must have expanded since, and it must be full of
very faint microwave radiation. Now these predictions are confirmed the theory
is thought to be secure. Not that anything in science is eternally secure!
If you are intrigued by the story but wary of mathematics, do not worry; Simon
Singh spares us most of the maths, and he juggles with big ideas carefully and
tactfully. If he occasionally indulges himself - and us - by overstating and
oversimplifying, he is to be forgiven, for his enthusiasm carries us along and
opens up new vistas of understanding.
This is an important book on many levels. It shows the scientific spirit in all
its purity, combating powerful vested interests not only outside but inside
science itself. It seems that scientists are mostly conservative chaps who
learn what they are taught and resist new insights. It is only given to a few
to question the fundamental assumptions; but those are true scientists. The
spirit of enquiry is to the human mind as singing is to birds, wrote Kepler:
'We do not ask why birds sing; it is what they were created for.' Hallelujah.
Violence and Democracy by John Keane.
A review by Ivo Mosley.
Any discussion of democracy profits from bearing in mind Churchill's ironic
dictum, 'Democracy is the worst form of government in the world - except for
all the rest.' This one sentence acknowledges that democracy is not a cure-all,
that we need government only because we cannot live together without it, and
that democracy brings to the world of human self-management huge new problems
of its own.
The subject of violence and democracy is a big remit and surely the central one
of our times. We seek to spread democracy across the earth in the hope that it
may save humanity from its (that is, our) massively increased powers of
destruction and self-destruction. John Keane argues that a distaste for
violence assumes its most effective and institutionalised expression in what he
calls 'mature democracies'. But his argument rests more on wishful thinking
than on reality.
Keane confesses he is baffled by the enjoyment of violence in popular culture.
This is hardly a qualification for the author of a book on violence and
democracy, and he proceeds to ignore most of the ways democracies engage in
violence. Gone is the violence of a democratic leader 'getting tough' to win
votes - as when Putin crushed Chechnya. Gone is the violent democratic
destruction of minorities such as the Native Americans, Chinese minorities in
South-East Asia and the Tutsi in Rwanda. Gone is democracy as an opening for
violent fascism, as in Germany in the 1920's. Gone is the huge covert industry
of arms sales and the system of international debt which finances secret
police, torture chambers and helicopter gunships - debt supplied by 'mature
democracies' and incurred by poverty-stricken populations so their rulers can
oppress them. Gone are chronic wars fought over commodities in high demand in
the West such as diamonds, coltan, cocaine, heroin and oil. Even such old
outrages as democracy's involvement in fire-bombing, the nuclear bomb and the
napalming of civilians are reserved as an afterthought for the very last
paragraph of the book.
This non-recognition of our human world continues on from John Keane's earlier
books on civil society, which have proved useful propaganda in the cause of
globalisation. His 'wouldn't-it-be-lovely' vision of civil society as decent
people all getting along with each other ignores the rampant and often criminal
greed which motivates international activity. The proper limits of government,
the nature of the rule of law and the grievous lack of international law
receive little or no consideration. Nor does he question whether voting once
every few years between rival collections of shallow-minded rogues deserves the
name 'democracy'.
So the book never really gets a grip on the problems it affects to address. The
democratic phenomenon of cack-handed and infantile power-mongers like George
'Dubya' Bush and Tony Blair stomping around and causing global chaos is not
addressed; nor is the incipient fascism of Berlusconi. Democracy is preserved
as if behind a veil, pure and unblemished, a uniquely civilized and civilizing
force. To this end Keane wrenches language somewhat out of its normal usage.
'Democratisation of violence' doesn't mean handing out machetes to a Hutu
majority, it means public scrutiny of a kind that neutralises violence. 'Civil
society' shifts from its original meaning - of society as a plethora of
voluntary associations in which government has only a protective role - to a
vaguely conceived Utopia where everyone is nice to one another.
His assumption that democracies are peaceable by nature does have one piece of
evidence going for it: 'mature' democracies do not make war on each other. But
is that because they are democracies or because they all own each other via the
multinational corporations? In everyday terms, these corporations have most
power in most people's lives and they have no interest in war in the West. But
whether they contribute to the overall peace of the world is another subject
that does not find mention in this book.
This is a book by a believer, written for other believers. My objection to it
is, to keep democracy alive and well we need more self-critical honesty than is
present in this book. For what is there left to believe in, in today's world,
if not democracy?
Article: Re-Thinking Democracy
Ivo Mosley argues that what we call 'Democracy' is not what was originally
meant by democracy at all. Could we make a truer - and more modern - democracy
by learning from the ancient Greeks?
Although we assume our democracy is modelled on the ancient Greek system, there
are essential differences. They did not vote for representatives. The governing
Council of 500 was chosen by lot and so were most of the officials, selected
much as a jury is selected now. The terms served were short. Council members
served for one year and could not serve more than two terms. Athens was small -
the total number of citizens probably never reached 50,000. By the time they
died, most citizens had held political office of some kind at least once.
Administration of the State was coordinated by the Council of 500 and they also
prepared proposals (changes in law, declarations of war and so forth) for the
general Assembly. Any citizen could attend the Assembly, which met on roughly
40 days spaced throughout the year. Final decisions were taken there by votes
cast directly on each proposal, after speeches before and against.
Moses Finley defends ancient Greek politics against two camps of critics:
elitists, who said it was
too
democratic; and anti-elitists, who said it was not democratic enough (because
women and slaves did not have citizenship). He defends it as a system that
actually worked, whatever its shortcomings, for 200 years. It was democracy of
an extremely direct kind, which has not been tried since.
Voting for representatives began with the Romans as a way of suppressing
democracy. The common people were allowed, after much agitation, to elect
people to represent their interests, but the candidates had to come from the
ruling senatorial class. Thus an element of democracy was introduced, while
true power remained within the ruling class.
Along with political representation came the kind of long-term political
alliances that would later be recognised as political parties. The practical
realities of electing representatives once every few years meant that voters
had to vote for a whole raft of interests - in other words, for a political
programme. Politicians were identified by which faction they belonged to,
usually based on which class they promised to represent.
When democracy started making inroads into the European political scene more
than a thousand years later it imitated the Roman model, but with a significant
difference. Voting itself was restricted by property and/or rank. When the
franchise widened some two centuries later to include most male adults, a new
party was born - the Labour party. It also had a class-based agenda - the
redistribution of wealth. Now, more than a century later, we are left in an
anomalous situation. The old ruling class has been disempowered, but our system
of democracy was designed to keep power in a ruling class. As a result, a
ruling class is continually created out of those who can work the system to
their advantage. We live in an illusion of democracy.
There are periodic flurries of discussion about how we could improve democracy,
but only recently have people begun to discuss whether it might be a good idea
to incorporate an element of Greek democracy in our modern system. Would it be
an improvement, for instance, if the House of Commons were chosen by lot,
replacing professional 'lifer' politicians with ordinary people? This is the
central suggestion in a new book by Keith Sutherland,
'The Party's Over'
The jury, he suggests, should be drawn from ordinary people with a minimum age
qualification (he suggests 30). There could of course be other requirements -
perhaps to undergo a basic course of study in political history, akin to taking
a driving test. He suggests that the Upper House consist of life peers chosen
by parliament for their experience, achievements, or service, and that these
'Lords Advocate' be responsible for preparing and presenting business to the
Commons, and also for presenting the opposing arguments. The administrative
side of government - ministers and so forth - would be appointed by a
bureaucracy attached nominally to the Crown but acting in accordance with the
wishes of parliament. Ministers could be removed, and policies reversed, by a
simple vote of no confidence.
One can only speculate on whether such juries would approve the panoply of
madnessess, great and small, that plague the modern world. It may be the case
that Western 'democracies' are too entrenched, psychologically and
structurally, to change. We are used to thinking that our single vote once
every few years is the one true sign that we live in a democracy. Without it,
what power would we have? The irony is, the vote is a symbol of power that
keeps us powerless. It is an illusion: it keeps us from looking at how we might
participate and determine our own destiny, rather than drift helplessly in the
power of those most unscrupulous and unsavoury characters - politicians and
Chief Executives. To adapt a phrase from the great Teutonic ventriloquist Karl
Marx: 'voting is the opium of the people.'
Understanding Islamic Terrorism, by Patrick Sookhdeo. (302 pages, Isaac Publishing.)
A review by Ivo Mosley.
Books examining Islamic terrorism take a variety of different approaches and
ask a variety of different questions. What have we in the West done to provoke
it? Is our response morally justified? Is it effective or does it exacerbate
the situation? Are we involved in a clash of civilizations that we must win or
lose? This book gets right to the heart of the matter from the point of view of
Western self-defence. Clearly and interestingly written, it reads like a
handbook for the security forces, a compendium for getting to know the enemy.
Its practical approach means it is free both from grovelling attempts at
political correctness or arrogant pronouncements of the West's cultural
superiority. I cannot imagine a more dispassionate book on the subject. The
principal questions it addresses are, 'To what extent is Islam an inherently
violent religion?' and 'What can the West do to protect itself?'
Patrick Sookhdeo draws on many sources and much scholarship to present an
extremely convincing account of violence in the Islamic tradition. While Allah
is described in the Koran repeatedly as 'the Compassionate, the Merciful' his
prophet Muhammad engaged in offensive warfare right from the start, sanctioning
murder and even torture in the cause of Islam. Muhammad's actions are regarded
by Muslims as 'not only good and just, but divinely sanctioned,' Sookhdeo
writes. Violence in the service of God is, according to tradition, not only
glorious but even a duty. Attempts by moderate, liberal or modernising Muslims
to re-interpret the sacred texts strain simple understanding - but ironically
are probably the best hope for the future.
Of course, violence in sacred texts and violence in everyday life are two
different things. The most vivid example of this is the violence in Christian
history, contrasting so starkly with the the non-violence of the Christian
message. The resurgence of violence in Islam is against the wishes of most
Muslims, who like most people everywhere want a peaceful life. Terrorists are
even more threatening to moderate Muslims that they are to the West; not only
do they want to kill moderate Muslims, they make non-Muslims wary and
aggressive towards all Muslims.
So it is moderate Muslims who have most to gain from getting rid of terrorists.
The most hopeful of Sookhdeo's observations from history is that Crusaders and
Muslims joined forces in 1140 to destroy the troublesome and powerful
Assassins, a Muslim sect devoted to murder and martyrdom. This, however, was a
sect with visible power bases - castles - that could be physically destroyed.
The network of terrorist organisations is a more difficult target. Similar in
organisation to Western NGO's, terrorist groups swap personnel, cooperate and
share resources. Endlessly fissiparous and re-combining they make 'complex,
ever-shifting networks, closely linked to and resourced by mainstream Muslim
society, not a lone clearly defined entity.' In their religious devotion to
murder it seems they are developing some of the character of the Thuggees of
nineteenth-century India.
Sookhdeo addresses the issue of whether the West might alter the way it
interacts with Islamic nations, but only in passing and in the context of
complete separation. The commercial and cultural empire of the West is a global
problem and it creates minorities of anyone who finds it uncongenial - or who
is dispossessed by it. Islam is the only organised resistance to this empire
and is attractive to many for that reason. Another approach to Islamic
terrorism mentioned by Sookhdeo is to see it as Arab nationalism in disguise.
How often do we hear complaints of non-Arab Muslims that their struggles are
taken over by Arab fighters and Arab money? Without oil revenue from the West,
the impoverished lands of Arabia could hardly furnish money, weapons and
personnel for modern warfare. The protection of the Saudi regime by successive
American administrations might come in for a little more criticism. The
extraordinary fact of the oil lobby taking over the White House is not
mentioned.
Sookhdeo does, however, deliver in passing a powerful explanation of why it has
been so hard to establish secular states under Islam. Separation of church and
state is that much harder when law, warfare and politics are all circumscribed
by the dictates of sacred text. A kind of totalitarian theocracy is the logical
fulfilment of Islam, every citizen scrutinising every other citizen as to
whether they are the approved kind of Muslim. Other 'peoples of the book' -
Jews and Christians - are to be tolerated, subject to extra taxation, but in
practice this tolerance is waning as children are educated to hate Jews and
Christians, often by Wahhabi imams funded by Saudi oil money. Polytheists and
atheists must in any case be killed.
With Pakistan and now Iran coming on line as nuclear powers we are surely in
for some tough times. With the few caveats mentioned above, I recommend that
anyone wishing to understand Islamic terrorism should read this book. It also
has an extremely useful glossary.
Well, we've heard from the grumpy old men, now here's one from
but no, to
call Alice Thomas Ellis grumpy would be to underestimate her acuity, anger and
wit - and also her unselfishness. As for the words 'old woman' - well, what a
relief to hear from one of those in this world saturated by youth and maleness:
most of today's 'significant women' seem as testosterone-packed as the men.
'God Has Not Changed' is a collection of short pieces which Ellis wrote for
The Oldie
over (presumably) a number of years, after being sacked for her outspokenness
by
The Universe
. The pieces are not dated, which is occasionally annoying when some topical
reference eludes one. But by and large the themes are thoroughly contemporary -
the degradation of Church, state and finally civilization itself by the new
liberal tyranny, which pretends to 'inclusiveness' and 'democracy' when what it
mostly does is plunge us into despair.
Ellis does not pull her punches, but she makes us smile. 'One of the troubles
with the devil is that he has lousy taste
I sometimes think that perhaps
he lives in Islington and reads
The Tablet,
but I may be doing him an injustice.' She is one of that increasingly vocal
phenomenon - a conservative who rails against the status quo. It is hardly
surprising that conservatives are the new angry people; they grieve for what
has been lost and are miserable about the tawdriness of what has been gained.
And of course almost all of us are in this sense conservative. The only people
happy with the new regime are those, drunk on power, who have gained by our
loss - and those superficial enough to believe that happiness is a new design
of mobile phone.
What power-mongering liberals have done to the Catholic Church is Ellis'
special hate. 'Heretical, smarmy, treacherous,' they believe that only one type
of person is worthy of toleration - themselves. They arrive at this position by
'disapproving of nobody except those who disapprove of somebody else. We must
not be judgemental, they say, smiling all over their faces and contriving
simultaneously to wag their fingers, pat themselves on the back and hug
sinners.' They have fudged moral boundaries: no wonder 'a disproportionate
number of priests have turned sex fiends and their bishops have striven to
protect them from exposure.' It is refreshing to hear this phenomenon ascribed
to the tyranny of liberalism and not to the beast of religion itself, as our
modern secular media would have it.
The modern style of church is not attractive to those who crave true religion.
'The Catholic Church has slithered all over the place, alienating vast numbers
of its followers in its anxiety not to appear old-fashioned, and the result is
grey and lumpy and fluffy and soggy, like a badly ordered wash in too much
dirty water.' Those who want religion with a simple message - whether it's
'get-rich-quick' or 'one-stop-salvation' will of course turn to the new forms
of born-again evangelism pioneered by the Americans.
Whatever its convictions, true religion springs from the observation that the
world is - to put it mildly - not set up to satisfy our every impulsive whim.
False religions (usually corruptions of the true) say - oh come on, life's not
that bad really, God is nice and wants you to pleasure yourself. In these pages
Ellis chronicles Christianity shifting from true to false as it is taken over
by 'snake-oil salesmen'. Her observations are not confined to the Church: the
degradation of our political tradition comes in for some sharp comment. 'I
don't think anyone now imagines that people go into politics with any other aim
than to improve their status while wasting vast sums on whatever stupid idea
has presently taken hold of them.'
Ellis represents an older tradition: she makes great demands on others but
equal if not greater demands on herself. It is surely by this tradition that
civilization is sustained. 'Learning to 'love yourself' when you really know
yourself can turn out to be an impossibility,' she writes.
Love one another
is the command in this tradition; loving oneself is narcissism, a
self-indulgence tending to the pathological. Inner peace is not thereby
achieved.
Understanding the world has never been more a prerequisite to living in some
degree of peace with it. 'The forces of darkness need hardly trouble themselves
to get out of bed,' Ellis writes, 'when the human race is proving itself so
adept at self-destruction.' The Church itself is 'a case of attempted suicide,
its garments - tradition, authority, faith, beauty, liturgy - littering the
shoreline.' For those who find modernity a discomfiting location there are
comforts of insight and agreement in this book - and also some take-home
messages. My own best, is that despair is the sin most annoying to God. Now
there's a tough position to work from.
The Fly in the Cathedral
by Brian Cathcart.
Reviewed by Ivo Mosley.
It is interesting that popular science books need a frisson of old-fashioned
religion to have a chance of selling really well. This fact has been
acknowledged ever since Stephen Hawking attributed the huge sales of his book
A Brief History of Time
to its concluding words, 'for then we would know the mind of God'. Apparently
it is an attractive proposition, that the mind of God should consist of
something as simple and sublunary as a single equation!
From the title of this book one might expect some religious content. 'The Fly
in the Cathedral' sounds like 'The Fly in the Ointment', the ointment being
perhaps religion under attack from science. But no; any allusion to religion is
confined to the title. This is a scientific whodunnit, the 'crime' in this case
being the splitting of the atomic nucleus. The 'Fly in the Cathedral' was, the
book tells us, once a well-known analogy for the size of the nucleus vis-a-vis
the whole atom. The better-known comparison made by Rutherford - a 'Gnat in the
Albert Hall' - would not perhaps have made such an intriguing title.
The splitting of the atom was one of those scientific events which caught the
public imagination. We now know that atomic nuclei can split on their own
without any human help; uranium 235 nuclei, for instance, have a habit of
disintegrating suddenly into smaller ones of barium and krypton. But in 1930
the nucleus was thought to be a stable and almost impregnable fortress. It was
known to contain particles; but to find out exactly what particles, and to
understand what held them together, it would be necessary to 'penetrate the
nucleus' and break it apart.
What excites the public and what excites the scientists is not always the same.
When the newspapers heard that the 'basic building block of Nature' had been
split in two, they promised huge consequences for humanity. The energy released
would be harnessed and transform our lives. The alchemist's dream of turning
base metals into gold would now be a possibility. Unlimited wealth, power and
comfort were in store: the event was a giant step in the scientific project to
transform our lives from nasty, brutish and short to pleasant, civilized and
long.
Now, seventy years on, this project and even science itself appear somewhat
tarnished. We realise that scientific progress brings as many - maybe more -
problems as it brings solutions. We are no longer convinced that material
comforts or even medical advances are unalloyed benefits; the other sides to
these coins are with us all the time. So tales of past achievments have a
certain nostalgia value for the innocent faith in which they were pursued.
What really appeals about tales of science before about 1940 is the ingenuity,
the ascetic lack of resources and the almost naïve enthusiasm of those
involved. Scientists were a varied and characterful bunch and here we have some
good examples; the dynamic, tyrannical and single-minded Rutherford; the
wayward genius Gamow; the shy boffins Cockcroft and Walton. Cockcroft was said
to be not allowed to leave the dinner table by his wife and children until he
had uttered at least two sentences. It took Walton years to summon up
confidence to propose to his sweetheart, an old acquaintance from school whom
he re-met on a railway station when the train broke down (did that really
happen in the good old days?)
Nowadays, of course, science is justified by the benefits it will bring; it has
to be, because huge amounts of public money are committed to it. But
Rutherford's laboratory flourished at the end of a period when scientific
research was motivated by curiosity, excitement and - hardest to believe of all
- wonder. There was no need to justify the search; the community of science was
a community of believers and passionate curiosity was the common binding force.
Their lives and activities were financed by others with the same passion and
even industrial sponsors were not, it seems, looking for strict financial
return. Openness was expected until the finishing line was in sight. The only
crime was to fake results; the only misdemeanours were lack of rigour in
thought or experiment.
Now that science has been absorbed by big business and governments and its
gifts to the human race seem double-edged at best, such innocence is absent.
The huge amounts of money that stand to be made from secrecy, patenting and the
rest, and the demand for commercial or military payback tarnish the endeavour.
The race for the human genome reads like any other tale of greed. Only wild
optimists expect it to deliver good and evil in other than equal measure. The
codification of the human genome, for instance, is a tale of greed,
manipulation and secrecy by comparison.
This book is an absorbing account of one episode in an intriguing period of
scientific discovery. Of course we must believe that the discovery was terribly
important, and we are assured it was. It has certainly has had momentous
consequences, not least the development of nuclear weapons by which a few
politicians can now kill most of humanity all at once. The author is at pains
to tell us that other consequences less malign have followed, but that is
hardly the point. The thrill of the chase is what matters.
But the strangest part of the story of twentieth century physics is not the
progress it has enabled - impressive though that may be - but its movement from
a position of certainty to one of utter confusion. At the beginning of the last
century, physicists were convinced that the theoretical side of their
discipline was all sewn up: all that remained was for experimenters to make
ever more accurate measurements confirming what was already known. There were
some anomalies to be sure - experimental results that seemed to contradict
established laws - but they were regarded as minor misunderstandings or
experimental mishaps. Then, in 1900 and 1905, Planck and Einstein suggested
explanations for the anomalies which blew the whole ship of classical theory if
not out of the water, then at least into dry dock. The status of HMS Newtonian
Physics was demoted from 'Grand Overall Explanation' to 'Limited Working
Theory' and since then no new Grand Explanation has taken its place. Instead,
two irreconcilable Limited Working Theories - Relativity and Quantum - hold the
stage side by side in mocking incoherence.
This aspect of the story of physics receives scant attention in the book;
indeed there is an element of denial about it. The discovery of a huge array of
new particles, following the splitting of the atom, is greeted as a fresh
wonder rather than a muddying of the waters. The simple picture we once had of
neutrons, protons, electrons and postitrons making up the universe has now been
shattered. New 'fundamental' particles are discovered all the time (they now
number in their hundreds) and evidence of 'virtual' or imaginary particles is
feverishly hunted down in support of one or other mathematical theory. The
world of theoretical physics is in more disarray today than it has ever been.
Furthermore, the practical scientific advances of the last century seem to have
provided not so much a comforting solution or the achievment of an Eden, as an
ongoing challenge for humanity. And it is one we are finding hard to meet. Have
we come to terms with the fact that machines now do most of the work? Have we
accomodated ourselves to being able to predict diseases that we cannot cure?
Have we worked out whether we want to turn the planet into a patchwork of
monocultures and lose the wondrous diversity of Nature? These and a thousand
other questions beg troubling answers.
Thus science, which was supposed to explain all of God's creation and give us a
system of management, has been stymied by the same frustrations that confound
all such utopian schemes. I am assured by a working scientist that science
faculties now contain more religious practitioners that humanities faculties.
It is as if we non-scientists lag behind scientists in that we still believe in
the rationalist project of science to sort out all mystery. Scientists - or at
least physicists - on the other hand are familiar with the frustrations and
inconsistencies of the universe and in direct contact with its baffling mystery
. Whether this is a matter of hope or merely an irrelevant curiosity remains to
be seen.
Sex Education or Indoctrination?
by Valerie Riches.
Reviewed by Ivo Mosley.
'It is now the privelege of the Parental State to take major decisions -
objective, unemotional, the State weighs up what is best for the child.' Was
this statement made by the Nazi Minister for the Family? No, it was made in
1980 by the founder of the Brook Advisory Centres, but this book argues there
is a direct ideological linkage between them.
Now the State takes responsibility for our morality as well as for our
education, health, survival, etcetera, what kind of morality is it trying to
impose upon us? This book traces the new morality back to its pioneers, the
racist eugenicists of the early twentieth century. Their vision was tripartite;
genetic 'cleansing' of defects (including race), population control and sexual
freedom. Discredited by the antics of the Nazis this movement went underground,
but this book claims many of the same proto-fascist personnel resurfaced in the
various population control lobbies of Europe and America. These lobbies have
determined the new State moralities of the post-war era. It all sounds horribly
familiar - a Brave New World-type vision of tower blocks and formica tops
amidst which humans copulate for recreational purposes only. Genetically
engineered for perfection, they may reproduce only when the State decides.
Of course the State no longer goes for genetic perfection, and population
control is hardly compatible with child maintenance payments. But the morality
of sexual freedom is official and it is communicated to children in school
regardless of their parents' beliefs.
Before the State took responsibility, there were huge variations in what
teenagers knew about sex and in the moral rules they expected to follow. There
were many communites and many moralities. This diversity was important; the
idea that one morality suits all is utopian and idiotic. If a child finds the
morality it is brought up with oppressive, it can find external support now
more easily than ever. Is it really appropriate for the State to teach one
morality to all, let alone the one it has chosen to favour?
Supposing disease and pregnancy were medically separable from sexual
intercourse - would promiscuity then be a fine thing for humanity? There may
indeed be humans who flourish in the kind of society envisaged by social
engineers, but a more common experience is that love, trust and respect are
heavily involved in sexual relationships. Human societies have flourished on
the moral habits of the gibbon, not the baboon. The tension between what we
instinctively want to do and what we must do is one of the burdens of being
alive.
This book is to be welcomed because it confronts the fact that as the State
grows stronger, it seeks to undermine everything that might compete with it in
power. The family is one such competitor; and it is vital that it be protected;
for whatever suffering may take place under its aegis, it is the repository of
human diversity and moral responsibility, and the bearer of traditions that
enable us to be human. In love and conflict we grow, and even from the family's
more destructive manifestations we may learn. Since the State took over moral
teaching there has been a huge increase in sexually transmitted disease and
teenage pregnancy, to mention only the most obvious and measurable negative
results.
The author does not make it clear whether she wants the State to adopt her own
moral position or whether she wants morality left to family, religion and
public debate. My own preference would be for the State to depart from the
whole business of sexual propaganda with a big kick up the backside.
On a television programme reminiscing about the 1960's, a woman recalled how
she and her flatmates were promiscuous as a matter of principle. Men came and
went and treated the girls with scant respect. It began to seem more like
exploitation than fun, so the girls decided to charge for their services.
Immediately the men's attitudes changed; they were courteous, respectful, and
knew their boundaries. Promiscuity is more degrading than prostitution because
in a world of no limits, trust and betrayal are no longer meaningful; the whole
area of moral life has been voided. One whole area of freedom - perhaps the
most important one - has been abolished. And that leaves a big subject for
debate - what is freedom?